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Active CDS Trading and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We investigate the effect of the development of the credit default swap (CDS) market on firms’ 
voluntary disclosure choices. The CDS market has been criticized for its vulnerability to insider 
trading by informed lenders who trade on borrowers’ private information. We predict that the 
threat of private information revelation in the spreads of actively traded CDSs will pressure 
managers into enhancing their voluntary disclosures to mitigate the litigation and reputation risks 
associated with non-disclosure. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that managers are more 
likely to issue earnings forecasts when firms have actively traded CDSs. Our results also suggest 
that liquid CDSs discipline managers to disclose bad news earnings forecasts, despite their 
career- and wealth-related incentives to withhold adverse information. In addition to disclosures 
via management forecasts, we document that liquid CDSs also elicit disclosure via firm-initiated 
press releases. Our findings suggest that informed trading by lenders in the CDS market results 
in a positive externality for the capital markets by eliciting enhanced voluntary disclosures, thus 
contributing to a richer information environment. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the effect of a significant institutional environment change of the 
last two decades – the development of the credit default swap (CDS) market – on firms’ 
voluntary disclosure choices.1 The CDS market has enabled financial institutions to distribute 
credit risk to parties that are more willing and able to bear it, thereby enhancing liquidity and 
flexibility in the financial system (Greenspan, 2004). However, many have criticized CDSs for 
significantly exacerbating the recent financial crisis (e.g., Bank of England, 2008, and Stanton 
and Wallace, 2011) and decreasing the efficiency of lender monitoring (e.g., Ashcraft and 
Santos, 2009, and Gong et al., 2013). An important additional criticism of the CDS market is its 
vulnerability to insider trading, given that large financial institutions, the common counterparties 
in CDS contracts, often trade on inside information about CDS obligors obtained through their 
lending activities (e.g., The Economist, 2003, The Financial Times, 2005, Acharya and Johnson, 
2007, and Standard and Poor’s, 2007). We propose that this allegedly negative attribute of the 
CDS market – informed trading by lenders – results in a positive externality for capital markets 
by eliciting enhanced voluntary disclosures from CDS reference entities. 
Large financial institutions trade in the CDS market to satisfy their hedging and speculative 
needs, and also serve as dealers, often supplying spread quotes for firms to which they have loan 
exposure. Because lenders typically do not have perfect Chinese walls between their lending and 
trading activities, material non-public information is frequently traded on in the lightly-regulated 
CDS market.2 Thus, CDS spreads often reflect private information ahead of public disclosures 
                                                
1 A CDS protects the buyer of the contract against default risk in return for a periodic payment (CDS spread) over 
the term of the contract. The buyer is compensated if the referenced entity and/or its credit instruments experience a 
“credit event” specified in the contract, such as default, restructuring, bankruptcy or a credit rating downgrade.  
2 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 excluded swaps from the definition of “securities”, thus 
largely exempting CDSs from the restrictions of SEC’s Rule 10b-5. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act extends the reach of 
Rule 10b-5 to the over-the-counter derivatives markets, including the CDS market. However, legal scholars 
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and price discovery in the equity and bond markets (e.g., Standard and Poor’s, 2007, Acharya 
and Johnson, 2007, Qiu and Yu, 2012, and Whitehead, 2012). We expect that the threat of 
lenders trading on private information in the CDS market and the consequent prompt reflection 
of such information in CDS spreads impose pressure on managers to enhance their voluntary 
disclosures to mitigate the litigation and reputation risks associated with non-disclosure.3 
We expect the CDS market to have a pronounced effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure 
choices mainly when CDS contracts are actively traded. Prior literature shows that, by 
stimulating trade by informed investors, liquidity enhances price discovery in the stock market 
(e.g., Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001, Khanna and Sonti, 2004, and Chordia et al., 2006). 
Liquid prices are more informative to investors due to their timely incorporation of information, 
increased incorporation of private information and quicker convergence to fundamentals (e.g., 
Chordia et al., 2006, Sadka and Scherbina, 2006, and Fang et al., 2009). Further supporting the 
importance of liquidity in enhancing the information content of CDS spreads, Qiu and Yu (2012) 
find that informed lenders are the primary liquidity providers in the CDS market. They show that 
the number of CDS dealers is strongly associated with the number of banking relationships of the 
CDS obligor and that the most liquid firms in the CDS market are associated with the highest 
level of informed trading. We follow Qiu and Yu (2012) and measure CDS liquidity by the CDS 
market depth, proxied by the number of distinct dealers providing CDS spread quotes.4  
To empirically test our predictions, we focus on the management decision to issue earnings 
forecasts, which represents one of the most important voluntary disclosure choices (Beyer et al., 
                                                                                                                                                          
acknowledge that enforcement of Rule 10b-5 will be substantially more challenging in the CDS market, as the rule 
must accommodate the distinctive features of trading in credit derivatives (e.g., Yadav, 2014, and Levene, 2013).  
3 Firms are frequently asked by market participants to comment on their CDS spread changes when substantial 
movements in CDS spreads are unaccompanied by public information disclosure (Bloomberg, 2006, and WSJ, 
2006).  
4 Because CDSs trade over the counter, liquidity measures based on trading activity and bid-ask spreads are   
unavailable for a comprehensive sample of CDS contracts. We find robust results when we employ an alternative 
liquidity measure based on the number of traded CDS contracts with distinct maturities for a firm.  
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2010). We find that firms with actively traded CDS contracts are more likely to issue a 
management forecast relative to non-CDS firms or firms with low liquidity CDS contacts. 
Economically, having liquid CDSs increases the likelihood of a management forecast by 14.0%. 
We reaffirm this finding and show that liquid CDS trading is strongly associated with the 
number of management forecasts issued; the incidence rate ratio for management forecasts of 
firms with liquid CDSs relative to that of other sample firms is 1.49. While these findings are 
consistent with our hypothesis that actively traded CDSs enhance managers’ voluntary 
disclosure, it is possible that firms with liquid CDS contracts are different from non-CDS firms 
or from firms with low liquidity CDSs in ways that are systematically related to their voluntary 
disclosure choices. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we conduct a battery of tests.  
First, we perform a comparative analysis of liquid CDS firms with a matched-firm sample 
constructed using the propensity score methodology (PSM). Despite the substantially smaller 
sample size in this analysis relative to the one employed in our primary tests, we continue to find 
a significant effect of liquid CDSs on both the likelihood and the number of management 
forecasts issued. Second, to tackle the endogeneity concerns associated with unobservable firm 
characteristics, we employ an instrumental variables approach. Following Qiu and Yu (2012), 
who show a strong positive relation between CDS liquidity and the number of lenders of the 
CDS obligor, our first instrument is based on the number of lenders in a firm’s outstanding loans. 
Because private lenders often get management updates about expected earnings via private 
financial disclosures, they are unlikely to seek public disclosure of earnings forecasts, suggesting 
that the variation in the number of lenders in a firm’s loans should not directly influence the 
managers’ earnings forecast decisions. Our second instrument reflects the ease with which 
investors can accomplish their hedging and speculative objectives in the bond market without the 
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need to trade in the CDS market. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2012) show that when the bond 
market is characterized by trading frictions and low liquidity, investors prefer the CDS market as 
the trading venue for their hedging and speculative needs. Following Boehmer et al. (2013), we 
use the bond trading volume of a firm’s industry peers to proxy for CDS trading demand, 
implying that stronger trading demand will drive higher CDS liquidity. At the same time, there 
are no obvious reasons to expect a strong association between a firm’s voluntary disclosures and 
an industry peer’s bond trading volume.5 The results of IV tests also suggest that firms with 
liquid CDSs are more likely to voluntarily disclose earnings news via management forecasts.  
To further mitigate endogeneity concerns, we exclude non-CDS firms from the analysis, 
because liquid CDSs firms are more likely to systematically differ from firms without any CDS 
trading than from illiquid CDS firms. The comparison of liquid CDS firms to firms with illiquid 
CDSs reveals that the former are more likely to inform investors via earnings forecasts. Finally, 
we examine firms’ earnings forecast disclosures around the change from low to high CDS 
liquidity. We find that both the forecast likelihood and the number of forecasts are significantly 
higher following the increase in CDS liquidity, further suggesting that systematic differences 
between liquid CDS firms and other sample firms are unlikely to explain our main findings. 
Having shown that firms with active CDS trading are more likely to engage in earnings 
forecast activity, we next examine whether liquid CDSs affect the voluntary disclosure of bad 
news. Because the information revelation of bad news is especially timely in the CDS market 
and often leads price discovery in the equity market (Acharya and Johnson, 2007, and Qiu and 
Yu, 2012), managers’ withholding of bad news will promptly become transparent to investors. 
Further, the threat of litigation and the loss of reputation arising from non-disclosure are higher 
when managers delay the disclosure of adverse information (e.g., Skinner, 1994, 1997, and 
                                                
5 We provide a more detailed discussion of the instrumental variables in Section 4.2.  
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Baginski et al., 2002). Thus, we expect actively traded CDSs to pressure managers to voluntarily 
disclose bad news, despite managers’ career- and wealth-related incentives for delaying the 
revelation of adverse information (Graham et al., 2005, and Kothari et al., 2009). 
We identify bad news earnings forecasts by comparing a management forecast with the 
most recent consensus analyst forecast (e.g., Anilowski et al., 2007) and examine their frequency 
for the sample of forecasting firms (i.e., firm-year observations with at least one management 
forecast). We find that liquid CDSs are associated with a significantly higher frequency of bad 
news forecasts, both in absolute terms and relative to the total number of earnings forecasts in a 
given year. In addition, we show that liquid CDSs are associated with a higher frequency of 
unbundled bad news forecasts (forecasts that are not bundled with earnings announcements). 
Because unbundled forecasts are typically more salient and are likely to provide more timely 
earnings expectation updates to investors (e.g., Atiase et al., 2005, and Baginski et al., 2012), we 
view this evidence as providing further support for the disciplining effect of active CDS trading 
on managers’ voluntary disclosure of negative earnings news.  
Next, we examine whether the effect of liquid CDSs on bad news disclosure strengthens 
with negative credit news, as revealed through CDS spread changes. If the threat of informed 
lenders trading on private information incentivizes managers to level the playing field between 
informed and uninformed investors, we expect the effect of CDS liquidity on the frequency of 
bad news forecasts to be stronger when CDS spread changes are high, conveying the arrival of 
negative news to investors. We find that the relation between liquid CDSs and the frequency of 
bad news forecasts is indeed stronger when firms experience high CDS spread changes, although 
this result is only marginally significant for unbundled forecasts.  
In our final set of analyses, because managers may convey information to investors through 
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multiple disclosure channels, we explore the association between a firm’s liquid CDS trading and 
its voluntary disclosure via press releases. As identifying voluntary disclosure through press 
releases and quantifying the sign of press release news is challenging (see the discussion in 
Section 4.5), we view our press release tests as mainly supplementary to our earnings forecast 
analyses. Using press releases disseminated via Dow Jones Newswires, we find that firms with 
liquid CDSs issue a higher number of press releases and have a higher frequency of negative 
press releases. Consistent with our tests of earnings forecast frequency, we also find that the 
effect of CDS liquidity on the frequency of negative press releases is stronger when CDS returns 
reflect negative credit news. Our findings suggest that, in response to liquid CDS trading’s 
pressure, managers may level the playing field between informed and uninformed investors not 
only by enhancing earnings forecast activity but also via other disclosure channels.  
Our study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. There is an intense debate 
in the literature about the economic effects of financial innovation in general, and credit default 
derivatives in particular. While some studies highlight the role of the CDS market in enhancing 
the liquidity and flexibility of credit markets (e.g., Saretto and Tookes, 2013), others indicate 
substantial negative consequences of CDS trading, such as the exacerbated credit risk of 
reference entities (e.g., Subrahmanyam et al., 2012), informed lenders’ insider trading (e.g., 
Acharya and Johnson, 2007), reduced lender monitoring and the empty creditor problem (Hu and 
Black, 2008, and Bolton and Oehmke, 2011) and the decline in lenders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism from the borrowing firm (Gong et al., 2013). We extend this literature by 
investigating how the CDS market affects CDS reference entities’ public disclosure choices. We 
demonstrate that, by imposing pressure on managers to enhance their voluntary disclosure 
practices, active CDS trading contributes to a richer information environment in capital markets.  
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Second, we contribute to the extensive research on voluntary disclosure. Prior studies have 
identified securities litigation, information uncertainty, institutional ownership, proprietary costs, 
management composition and investor sentiment as important drivers of disclosure choices (e.g., 
Verrecchia, 1983, Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008, Kwak et al., 2012, and Bozanic et al., 
2013). However, with the exception of Lo (2013), who examines changes in borrowers’ 
disclosure following the emerging-market financial crises of the late 1990s, little is known about 
how changes in the institutional environment affect managers’ incentives to voluntarily disclose 
information (Beyer et al., 2010). Our paper fills this void by documenting that the development 
of the CDS market and the threat of informed lenders’ trading in this market induce managers to 
enhance their voluntary disclosure practices. In particular, our evidence suggests that active CDS 
trading plays a disciplining role in eliciting the voluntary disclosure of bad news, despite 
managers’ career- and wealth-related incentives for delaying its revelation.  
Finally, we extend the growing research on the consequences of financial institutions’ 
exploitation of their access to firm’s private information through lending relationships. Ivashina 
and Sun (2011), Massoud et al. (2011) and Kang and Mullineaux (2011) show that institutional 
non-bank lenders trade in the equity market on the borrower’s confidential information around 
information intensive events and use private information to facilitate merger and acquisition 
deals. Bushman et al. (2010) find that lenders trade on private information in the secondary loan 
and equity markets, but that this informed trading enhances price discovery in both markets. Our 
contribution is to probe further into the potential positive externalities of financial institutions’ 
exploitation of information received in their capacity as private lenders. We suggest that the 
revelation of private information in CDS prices, induced by informed lenders’ trading, can lead 
to positive capital market effects by enhancing firms’ voluntary disclosures.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the prior research 
that motivates our analyses and our hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the sample and 
data. Section 4 reports our main results and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Motivation, Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Information flows in the CDS market 
Our study integrates two different strands of the literature – the literature on voluntary 
disclosure and the literature on information flow in the CDS market. Voluntary disclosure plays 
a key role in shaping a firm’s information environment. Previous studies demonstrate that 
managers’ voluntary disclosure choices are determined to a large extent by investor demand for 
information in the presence of uncertainty (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984, Waymire, 1985, and Coller 
and Yohn, 1997) and the threat of securities litigation (e.g., Skinner, 1994, and Baginski et al., 
2002). We expect the development of the CDS market, one of the most significant financial 
innovations in recent times, to have a substantial influence on managers’ voluntary disclosure 
practices. The CDS market has grown from an exotic niche market in the 1990s to the largest 
credit risk trading venue, with a total notional CDS amount outstanding of $27 trillion in June 
2012, following a peak of $62.2 trillion outstanding in the second half of 2007, prior to the 
financial crisis.6 We examine whether and how the frequent revelation of private information in 
the CDS market, which often leads public information disclosure and price discovery in other 
markets, affects managers’ incentives to voluntarily disclose information to investors.  
The distinguishing characteristic of the CDS market is that its dominant players are major 
banks and financial institutions with access to material non-public information on CDS obligors 
                                                
6 CDS contracts are mostly standardized according to the guidance of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA). CDS contracts have a variety of standard terms, ranging from six months to thirty years, 
although CDS contracts with a 5-year maturity are the most actively traded.  
9 
 
through their lending activities. This confidential information usually includes timely financial 
disclosures, covenant compliance information, amendment and waiver requests, financial 
projections, and plans for acquisitions or dispositions and is typically provided to lenders well in 
advance of its public release (Standard and Poor’s, 2007).7 In addition to trading in the CDS 
market to satisfy their hedging and speculative needs, large financial institutions also serve as 
dealers in this market, often supplying CDS spread quotes for firms to which they have loan 
exposure. While the guidance of International Swaps and Derivatives Association suggests that 
“…banks must not use private knowledge about corporate clients to trade instruments such as 
credit default swaps,” absent effective Chinese walls between loan officers and bank trading 
desks, material non-public information frequently gets traded on in the lightly regulated CDS 
market (e.g., Economist, 2003, Financial Times, 2005, and Standard and Poor’s, 2007).  
In addition, in recent years, hedge funds have substantially intensified their trading 
activities in the CDS market, further fuelling insider trading concerns. Hedge funds often get 
access to private information through participation in syndicated loans (e.g., Bushman et al., 
2011, Ivashina and Sun, 2011, and Massoud et al., 2011) and tight connections with large 
financial institutions (e.g., WSJ, 2006, The New York Times, 2007, Financial Times, 2009). In 
its first CDS insider trading case, the SEC recently charged a hedge fund manager with insider 
trading in CDSs on the basis of private information learned from a major investment bank 
(Financial Times, 2009, and Yadav, 2014).8  
                                                
7 Reg FD exempts the private communication of information to lenders conditional on lenders adhering to 
confidentiality provisions in loan agreements (LSTA, 2007a and 2007b, and Li et al., 2013). According to Loan 
Syndication and Trading Association (LSTA), if lenders breach these provisions, as in the case of trading on private 
information, the selective disclosure to lenders may no longer qualify as Reg FD compliant.   
8 The SEC alleges that Jon-Paul Rorech from Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. tipped Renato Negrin, a portfolio 
manager at Millennium Partners L.P., about the contemplated change to the bond structure of VNU N.V, and that 
Negrin purchased a CDS contract on VNU N.V for the Millennium hedge fund. 
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Because CDS spreads often reflect a substantial amount of private information transmitted 
via informed investor trading, changes in CDS pricing typically provide more timely feedback on 
a firm’s performance than its bond or equity pricing (Whitehead, 2012).9 In a number of 
acquisition-related transactions (e.g., First Data, HCA Inc., Harrah’s Entertainment Inc., 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp), CDS spreads reflected information about upcoming deals weeks 
ahead of the deals’ public announcements and price movements in the equity and bond markets 
(The Wall Street Journal, 2006 and 2007, Bloomberg, 2006, and The New York Times, 2007).10 
More generally, Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that the CDS market leads the equity market 
in price discovery, especially when a CDS reference entity has a high number of ongoing 
banking relationships, consistent with these financial institutions’ informed trading.11 Prior to 
adverse information events, CDSs also tend to lead equity option markets in price discovery 
(Berndt and Ostrovnaya, 2007), even though private information is typically quickly revealed via 
equity option trading (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987, Skinner, 1990, Chakravarty et al., 
2004, and Cao et al., 2005).12 
Lenders trading on a borrower’s private information and the consequent prompt reflection 
of such information in CDS spreads should make the withholding of information transparent to 
                                                
9 Bushman et al. (2011), Ivashina and Sun (2011) and Massoud et al. (2011) document that informed lenders also 
trade on private information in the equity market. However, this insider trading is limited to non-bank institutional 
investors, such as hedge funds, mutual funds and CLOs, with no evidence of commercial and investment banks 
engaging in such behavior. Also, the CDS market is considerably less regulated and scrutinized by the SEC relative 
to the equity market, facilitating insider trading in CDSs (e.g., ISDA, 2003, Bloomberg, 2006, The Wall Street 
Journal, 2006 and 2007, and Yadav, 2014).   
10 For example, on December 1st, 2006, when Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co (KKR) first approached First Data, the 
cost of insuring $10 million of First Data bonds against default was about $32,000. By December 19th, First Data 
swaps were trading at $49,000 (for $10 million notional) and on January 17th — the day First Data told KKR that the 
company’s board wanted to pursue a deal — the cost jumped to $70,000. The public announcement of the deal did 
not happen till April 2nd, 2007, when the cost of insuring $10 million bonds exceeded $112,000 (The Wall Street 
Journal, 2007).  
11 Blanco et al. (2005), Longstaff et al. (2005) and Norden and Weber (2007) also suggest that the CDS market plays 
an important role in equity price discovery.  
12 Interestingly, Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2007) find that the equity market does not respond to information revealed 
by option prices unless the information is also manifested in the CDS market; a potential explanation offered by the 
authors is that options are more likely than are CDSs to trade on unsubstantiated rumors. 
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investors. Thus, to mitigate the litigation and reputation risk associated with non-disclosure, we 
expect managers to enhance their voluntary disclosure practices. Due to the threat that lenders 
may engage in informed trading in the CDS market, managers may be compelled to inform 
investors at the same time they convey information to lenders, thus providing public disclosures 
simultaneously with information revelation through CDS spreads. However, managers may also 
choose to respond to insider trading by lenders, thus disclosing subsequently to conveying 
information to lenders and the private information revelation through CDS spread movements. 
Because our main focus is to examine whether liquid CDS trading elicits enhanced voluntary 
disclosures and due to fact that the exact timing of information provision from managers to 
lenders is unobservable, our hypotheses relate to the overall disclosure intensity, without 
differentiating between these two potential disclosure strategies.  
2.2 The importance of CDS market liquidity and empirical predictions 
A fundamental premise of our paper is that, due to lenders’ informed trading, CDS spreads 
reveal firm private information ahead of public disclosures and price discovery in other markets. 
We expect the revelation of private information through CDS spreads to be pronounced mostly 
when CDS contracts are actively traded, i.e., when CDS contracts are highly liquid. While there 
is little evidence on the role of liquidity in price discovery in the CDS market, a growing body of 
research shows that liquidity enhances price discovery in the stock market. Subrahmanyam and 
Titman (2001) and Khanna and Sonti (2004) model insiders’ behavior and show that liquidity 
stimulates trading by informed investors, thus making stock prices more informative to 
shareholders. Liquid prices incorporate information on a more timely basis, increase the 
incorporation of private information, enhance the convergence of stock prices to fundamentals 
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and are more informative about a firm’s future performance (e.g., Chordia et al., 2006, Sadka 
and Scherbina, 2006, Fang et al., 2009, and Sadka et al., 2013). 
The high involvement of informed financial institutions in liquidity provision in the CDS 
market further supports the importance of liquidity in enhancing the information content of CDS 
spreads. These institutions, which serve as dealers in this market, often supply CDS spread 
quotes for firms to which they have loan exposure. Qiu and Yu (2012) show that the number of 
dealers providing CDS spread quotes is determined to a large extent by the number of the CDS 
reference entity’s banking relationships. The authors infer that liquidity in the CDS market is 
provided by informed financial institutions. They further support their claim by showing that 
firms that tend to be the most liquid in the CDS market are associated with the highest level of 
informed trading, as measured by the incremental price discovery relative to the equity market. 
Based on the strong relation between liquidity and price discovery documented by prior 
research and the provision of liquidity by informed lenders in the CDS market, spreads of liquid 
CDS contracts are likely to promptly and accurately reveal private information communicated by 
firms to their lenders. Thus, due to the consequent increase in litigation and reputation concerns 
arising from non-disclosure, we hypothesize that high CDS liquidity will pressure managers to 
enhance voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, we do not expect thinly traded CDS contracts, 
which are unlikely to reflect private information on a timely basis, to induce changes in 
managers’ disclosure practices. 
Further, we expect liquid CDSs to have a significant effect on the voluntary disclosure of 
bad news. While a number of studies show that firms tend to preempt large negative earnings 
surprises (e.g., Skinner, 1994, 1997, and Kasznik and Lev, 1995), Kothari et al. (2009) argue that 
career concerns and managers’ personal wealth tied to a firm’s performance can induce 
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managers to withhold the disclosure of bad news in the hope that subsequent favorable outcomes 
will obviate the need to disclose it. Survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) also suggests that 
managers have strong incentives to withhold bad news. We argue that because the information 
revelation of bad news is especially timely in the CDS market and often leads price discovery in 
the equity market (Acharya and Johnson, 2007, and Qiu and Yu, 2012), managers’ withholding 
of bad news should become immediately transparent to investors. The litigation and reputation 
concerns associated with non-disclosure are also higher when managers delay the disclosure of 
negative news (e.g., Skinner, 1994, 1997, and Baginski et al., 2002). Plaintiffs in class-action 
lawsuits typically claim large losses due to significant security price declines caused by 
managers not disclosing adverse information promptly. Therefore, we expect that the threat of 
lenders engaging in informed trading on negative private information in the CDS market will 
overshadow managers’ career- and wealth-related incentives for delaying bad news and lead to 
the prompt disclosure of bad news. In other words, we expect liquid CDSs to play a disciplining 
role by encouraging managers to reveal adverse private information, hence contributing to an 
improved information environment. 
To examine our hypotheses, we focus on one of the most important voluntary disclosure 
choices – management’s decision to issue earnings forecasts. Beyer et al. (2010) show that, for 
the average firm, earnings forecasts account for 15.67% of the quarterly return variance and 
represent the main accounting-based information disclosure. We thus predict that firms with 
liquid CDSs are more likely to inform investors via earnings forecasts relative to non-CDS firms 
or firms with low liquidity CDSs. Because managers may level the playing field between 
informed and uninformed investors through additional disclosures, we supplement our analyses 
by examining another voluntary disclosure channel – firm-initiated press releases. We predict 
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that firms with liquid CDS contracts have higher press release intensity relative to other sample 
firms. Across all earnings forecast- and press-release-related disclosures, we expect the effect of 
liquid CDS trading to be particularly pronounced for the voluntary disclosure of bad news.  
 
3. Sample, Data and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1 Data sources and sample selection 
We employ the First Call database to obtain management forecast characteristics.13 The 
data on traded CDS contracts, including contract existence, the number of market makers and 
CDS spreads are from the Markit database, which covers the traded CDS contracts of U.S. firms 
starting in 2002. Data on firms’ lending relationships is retrieved from the DealScan database 
provided by Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation. The bond trading data and outstanding 
principal amounts are obtained from the TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) 
database and the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, respectively. Data on firm-initiated 
press releases is from RavenPack News Analytics, which covers all news disseminated via Dow 
Jones Newswires. Data on firm characteristics is obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. We 
obtain data on analyst coverage, equity issuances and institutional ownership from the I/B/E/S, 
Security Data Corporation’s Global News Issues and Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings 
(13F) databases, respectively.   
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. To align the availability of data from our 
two primary data sources, the First Call and Markit databases, we focus on the 2002-2010 period.  
For this period, First Call covers 8,702 firms, representing 57,396 firm-year observations. We 
                                                
13 Chuck et al. (2013) demonstrate that the First Call database does not incorporate all management forecasts 
(relative to a sample of forecasts hand-collected through a search of firm press releases). Because our sample period 
starts in 2002, this issue is mitigated for our study, as Chuck et al. (2013) show that First Call’s coverage is more 
comprehensive after 1997. Furthermore, our empirical analyses control for analyst following and institutional 
ownership, the two variables found to be associated with the comprehensiveness of First Call’s coverage.  
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also require COMPUSTAT data on firm characteristics, which restricts our sample to 5,034 
firms, representing 25,130 firm-year observations. We then match this sample to the Markit 
database (we previously hand-matched Markit to COMPUSTAT based on firm name). We find 
that 775 firms in our sample have traded CDS contracts over our sample period, representing 
4,517 firm-year observations.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our primary variables of interest. Our primary 
CDS liquidity measure, Liquid CDS, is estimated based on the number of distinct dealers 
providing CDS spread quotes for the firm on a given day and proxies for market depth 
(following Qiu and Yu, 2012). We focus our analyses on CDS contracts with a 5-year maturity 
and an MR (Modified Restructuring) clause, which represents the most commonly traded CDS 
contract type.14 We estimate the annual average of the number of distinct dealers for each firm in 
our sample (Depth). The quotes are reported, on average, by 6 dealers, with a standard deviation 
of 4.4 and an interquartile range of 5.9, suggesting a substantial variation in market depth. To 
account for the intertemporal evolution of CDS market liquidity over our sample period, we 
define the Liquid CDS variable as equal to one if the firm’s annual Depth measure in a given 
year is above the sample median depth in that year, zero otherwise (all variables are described in 
detail in Appendix B). The mean value of Liquid CDS indicates that 9% of the firm-year 
observations in our sample have liquid CDS contracts.  
We define the Forecast variable to be equal to one if the firm issues at least one annual or 
                                                
14 CR (Cumulative Restructuring), MM (Modified-Modified Restructuring) and XR (Ex-Restructuring or Without 
Restructuring) clauses are substantially less prevalent relative to the MR clause. Similarly, 5-year contracts are 
significantly more commonly traded than other tenors. In addition, Markit reports the number of distinct dealers 
providing quotes for 5-year contracts only.  
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quarterly forecast in a given year, zero otherwise.15 The mean value of the Forecast variable is 
0.43, which indicates that a considerable number of firm-year observations in our sample are 
characterized by management forecast activity (Kwak et al., 2012, report similar descriptive data 
for their 1997-2009 sample period). Number of Forecasts is estimated as the number of annual 
and quarterly forecasts in a given year and its mean is equal to 2.05 for our sample.   
Sample firms are relatively large, as reflected by the mean and median values of total assets 
(Firm Size). The mean market-to-book ratio (Market to Book) is 3.063. The mean (median) ratio 
of earnings before extraordinary items to total assets (ROA) is -0.003 (0.031). There is 
considerable variation in riskiness across sample firms, as reflected by the standard deviation of 
Return Volatility. Firms in our sample have substantial institutional ownership and analyst 
following. 9.2% of the sample firm-year observations experience equity issuance (Equity 
Issuance) and 32.7% of firm-year observations belong to high litigation industries (High 
Litigation Industry).  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The impact of liquid CDS trading on the issuance of management forecasts 
We start our analyses by testing the relation between the issuance of management earnings 
forecasts and the existence of high-depth (liquid) CDS traded contracts for the firm, controlling 
for other firm characteristics that are likely to be associated with management’s forecasting 
activity. We estimate the following Probit model: 
ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ	 ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀	ܥܦܵ ൅ ߚଶܨ݅ݎ݉	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ, ሺ1ሻ  
                                                
15 Following previous studies (e.g, Ajinkya et al. 2005, and Houston et al., 2010), we exclude from the analyses 
earnings forecasts issued between fiscal-period end and earnings announcement dates, i.e. pre-announcements, 
because these forecasts are considered a part of earnings announcement strategy, and not a voluntary disclosure 
activity. Our inferences remain the same when we include these pre-announcements in the measurement of forecast 
issuance and frequency (untabulated). 
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where Forecast  is an indicator variable reflecting whether a firm has issued at least one earnings 
forecast in a given year. Our main variable of interest, Liquid CDS, reflects whether a firm has 
liquid CDS contracts. We follow prior research (e.g., Baginski et al., 2002, Ajinkya, 2005, 
Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008, Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009, and Kwak et al., 2012) and 
control for firm size, market-to-book ratio, profitability, stock market volatility, institutional 
ownership, analyst following, equity issuance and membership in a high litigation industry. 
Following prior research, with the exception of profitability, stock market volatility and equity 
issuance variables that are estimated in the forecast year, other determinants of forecast 
likelihood are measured in the year preceding the forecast year. In all analyses, standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level.  
We present our findings in Table 3, Panel A. Consistent with our predictions, a significant 
and positive coefficient on Liquid CDS in column 1 indicates that the likelihood of an earnings 
forecast is positively associated with the existence of a firm’s liquid CDS contracts. This result is 
also economically significant: having liquid CDS contracts increases the likelihood of a 
management forecast by 14.0%. For comparison, a one standard deviation change in institutional 
ownership and analyst following increases this likelihood by 8.6% and 12.7%, respectively.  
To test the robustness of our findings, in column 2 we examine the number of management 
forecasts in a given year instead of the probability of a forecast being issued. We re-estimate 
model 1 above with the number of management forecasts issued – Number of Forecasts – as the 
dependent variable. Consistent with a strong association between Liquid CDS and the probability 
of a management forecast, we find that this variable is significantly associated with the number 
of management forecasts. The economic magnitude of this effect is sizable: the coefficient of 
0.395 on Liquid CDS in column 2 corresponds to an incidence rate ratio of 1.49, suggesting that 
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the management forecasts of firms with liquid CDS trading are 1.49 times more frequent relative 
to management forecasts issued by other sample firms.  
The coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. Firms with 
higher profitability are more likely to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts and issue a higher 
number of forecasts, while firms with a higher market-to-book ratio and higher stock return 
volatility are less likely to issue forecasts and forecast less frequently. Forecast activity is also 
increasing in institutional ownership and analysts’ following and is higher for firms belonging to 
high litigation industries, but is negatively associated with equity issuance.  
In Panel B of Table 3, we replicate our tests with an alternative liquidity measure based on 
the count of a firm’s CDS contracts with distinct maturities (terms) traded on a given day.16 We 
acknowledge that this measure is a noisy proxy for market depth, as it is likely to be strongly 
affected by a firm’s debt maturity structure and by differences in investors’ hedging demand for 
different debt terms. We hence view this analysis as a robustness check with respect to the tests 
presented in Panel A. We estimate the annual average of the number of distinct terms for each 
firm in our sample; sample firms have, on average, 7.6 terms traded on a daily basis. To account 
for inter-temporal variation in CDS market liquidity over our sample period, we define this 
alternative Liquid CDS variable to be equal to one if the firm’s annual average term count 
measure in a given year is above the sample median term count in that year, zero otherwise. We 
continue to find that liquid CDSs are strongly positively associated with the likelihood of 
issuance of a management forecast (column 1) and the number of management forecasts (column 
2). The economic significance of the term-count-based liquidity measure is similar to that of the 
Liquid CDS variable used in our primary tests. Having liquid CDS contracts increases the 
                                                
16 Saretto and Tookes (2013) use the daily number of CDS quotes as their primary liquidity measure. This measure 
is similar in spirit to our term-count-based measure, as it represents a combination of distinct term counts provided 
by different dealers.  
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likelihood of a management forecast by 13.7% and the incidence rate ratio for management 
forecasts of firms with liquid CDS contracts relative to that of other sample firms is 1.47.  
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 are consistent with our hypothesis that actively 
traded CDSs enhance managers’ voluntary disclosure activity. However, an important potential 
concern is the possibility that firms with liquid CDS contracts are different from non-CDS firms 
or firms with low liquidity CDS contracts in ways that are systematically related to voluntary 
disclosure choices. To examine whether endogeneity is likely to be driving our main results, we 
employ four additional tests, discussed in the next section: 1) propensity score matching, 2) an 
instrumental variable approach, 3) a comparison of highly liquid to non-liquid CDS firms, and 4) 
a liquidity change analysis.17  
4.2 Propensity score matching and instrumental variable approaches 
4.2.1 What factors determine the presence of a liquid CDS market? 
In this section, we mitigate endogeneity concerns by employing two empirical approaches 
that directly address the determinants of high CDS liquidity: a propensity score methodology 
(PSM) and an instrumental variable (IV) approach. To conduct PSM, we compare the disclosure 
choices of liquid CDS firms with a matched sample of non-CDS or non-liquid CDS firms. We 
construct a matched sample using PSM as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). PSM allows us to 
efficiently address the possibility that management forecasting behavior is correlated with 
observable firm characteristics that are substantially different for high CDS liquidity firms 
relative to other sample firms (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, and Li and Prabhala, 2007). An 
                                                
17 In addition to using the propensity score matching and instrumental variable approaches, Saretto and Tookes 
(2013) address CDS trading endogeneity using two CDS variables: an indicator variable equal to one if there is a 
CDS market for the firm’s debt at any time during their sample period and an indicator variable equal to one if there 
is a traded CDS during year t. This approach is not applicable in our setting for the following two reasons. First, 
while Saretto and Tookes (2013) examine the initiation of CDS trading, we test the effect of liquid CDS trading. 
Second, the vast majority of CDS firms in our sample (70%) have traded CDS contracts in all nine years of our 
sample period, implying very little difference between the existence of CDS trading at any time during our sample 
period and CDS trading in a given year.  
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instrumental variable approach further tackles the endogeneity concerns arising from the 
potential association of unobservable firm characteristics with both high CDS liquidity and the 
management’s propensity to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts. For parsimony, we use the 
same first-stage liquid CDS Probit model for both the PSM and IV approaches: 
ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀	ܥܦܵ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଶܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ൅ ߚଷܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ െ ݐ݋ െ ܤ݋݋݇ ൅ ߚସܴܱܣ
൅ ߚହܾ݈ܶܽ݊݃݅݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚ଺ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚ଻ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ	ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ
൅ ߚ଼ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܮ݁݊݀݁ݎݏ
൅ ߚଽܤ݋݊݀	ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݋ݎݏᇱܪ݁݀݃݅݊݀	&	ܵ݌݁ܿݑ݈ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܦ݁݉ܽ݊݀	 ൅ 	ߝ, ሺ2ሻ 
Prior literature suggests that asset maturity, leverage, market-to-book ratio, profitability, 
tangibility, asset size and earnings volatility are associated with the existence of CDS trading in 
general and with CDS market liquidity in particular (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos, 2009, Qiu and 
Yu, 2012, Boehmer et al., 2013, Gong et al., 2013, and Saretto and Tookes, 2013). We also 
incorporate into the model two additional variables (instruments) that are likely to be strongly 
associated with CDS market liquidity, but which are not expected to be directly related to the 
management’s voluntary disclosure choices.  
First, we control for the number of lenders involved in a firm’s outstanding loan contracts 
within a given year. Major financial institutions are the primary dealers in the CDS market and 
often have access to a firm’s private information through their lending and investment banking 
activities, which facilitates informed trading in the lightly regulated CDS market (e.g., Acharya 
and Johnson, 2007). Qiu and Yu (2012) hypothesize and find a strong positive relation between 
the number of distinct dealers providing CDS quotes and the number of a firm’s lenders, 
consistent with the positive association between the amount of informed CDS trading and the 
number of quote providers. We therefore predict a positive relation between CDS market 
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liquidity and Number of Lenders. At the same time, we do not expect the number of financial 
institutions involved in a firm’s loans to directly influence the manager’s decision about whether 
or not to issue earnings forecasts. Private lenders often get managements’ updates about expected 
earnings via private financial disclosures, covenant compliance reports and amendment and 
waiver requests and therefore are unlikely to seek external disclosure of earnings forecasts. 
Although there is some empirical evidence that lending practices may affect borrowers’ 
disclosures, this evidence primarily pertains to substantial shocks to the lending environment, 
such as a significant deterioration in a lender’s financial health (Lo, 2014) or its merger with 
another financial institution (Chen and Vashishtha, 2014). We consider it unlikely that the 
variation in the number of lenders involved in outstanding loans contracts will affect borrowers’ 
disclosure practices, especially in routine circumstances.  
We utilize the DealScan database to obtain the number of lenders involved in a firm’s 
syndicated loans. For each firm in our sample, we identify the syndicated loans outstanding in a 
given year and estimate the number of unique lenders involved in these loans. We then convert 
this count measure into a decile rank measure to mitigate measurement error and to better 
capture the variation in the intensity of lenders’ count. We base our lenders’ count measure on all 
lenders involved in the syndicate, as opposed to lead arrangers only, because many syndicate 
participants are either large financial institutions that often act as market makers in the CDS 
market or non-bank institutional investors that actively engage in speculative CDS trading. 
However, we replicate all relevant tests using only a count of loans’ lead arrangers and find 
generally similar results.  
The second instrumental variable we employ reflects the ease with which investors can 
accomplish their hedging and speculative objectives in the bond market without the need to trade 
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in the CDS market. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2012) show that CDS markets are larger when the 
underlying bond securities are harder to trade. In other words, investors prefer the CDS market 
as the trading venue for their credit hedging and speculative needs when the bond market is 
characterized by trading frictions and low liquidity. Following Boehmer et al. (2013), we use the 
bond trading volume of a firm’s two-digit SIC industry peers to proxy for CDS trading demand. 
If investors demand to trade the credit risk of a particular type of underlying asset (i.e., industry), 
the industry bond tradability is expected to affect the firm’s CDS market liquidity. We therefore 
predict a negative relation between CDS market liquidity and bond trading volume, as higher 
bond market liquidity should be associated with lower CDS trading needs. At the same time, the 
bond trading volume of industry peers should not be directly related to a firm’s voluntary 
disclosure choices. While it is possible that some disclosure patterns may be similar for firms in 
the same industry (e.g., Rogers et al., 2014), there are no obvious reasons to expect a strong 
association between a firm’s voluntary disclosure and an industry peers’ bond trading volume.  
For each firm in our sample, we retrieve from the TRACE database bond trading volume 
for all firms in the respective two-digit SIC industry. For each one of these bonds, we then 
collect the face value of the bond on the issue date from the Mergent database. To account for 
the size effect, we deflate the dollar volume of principal traded on a given day by the face value 
of the bond on the issue date. We then estimate the annual average bond trading volume of a 
firm’s industry peers. We convert this measure into a decile rank bond trading volume measure 
to better reflect the variation in bond market liquidity.  
We present the results of the liquid CDS Probit model in Panel A of Table 4. We find that 
larger firms and firms with a longer asset maturity and higher market-to-book ratios have higher 
CDS market liquidity. We do not find profitability, leverage and earnings volatility to be strongly 
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related to CDS liquidity. Of particular interest are the coefficients on the two instrumental 
variables. Consistent with our predictions, we find a positive and highly significant coefficient 
on the Number of Lenders variable. This finding is in line with the conjecture in Qiu and Yu 
(2012) that CDS liquidity is strongly related to the number of lenders with access to a borrower’s 
private information. The coefficient on the Bond Investors’ Hedging & Speculative Demand 
variable is negative and significant, consistent with lower demand for a liquid CDS market when 
bond trading is more liquid. While, to the best of our knowledge, Stock-Yogo statistics for 
instrument validity do not exist for Probit models, we evaluate the incremental explanatory 
power of our instruments with a Wald Chi2 test. The Chi2 test statistic is highly significant 
(103.94 with a p-value of <0.001), suggesting strong instruments. The partial pseudo-R2 of 4.9% 
suggests that our instruments have a reasonable explanatory power.  In addition, the liquid CDS 
Probit model’s relatively high pseudo-R2 of 46.7% suggests a well-specified first stage model. 
4.2.2 Propensity score matching and instrumental variable tests  
We present the results of PSM estimation in Panels B and C of Table 4. We match 
treatment observations (i.e., firm-year observations with liquid CDSs) with control observations 
(firm-year observations without CDSs or with non-liquid CDSs) based on the probability (i.e., 
“propensity score”) of Liquid CDS, as estimated by equation (2). We use the commonly used 
“nearest neighbor matching” approach with the further restriction that the absolute difference in 
the propensity scores of matched observations is below a pre-specified threshold (i.e., “caliper 
distance”). More specifically, we match without replacement and, to ensure appropriately 
matched samples, if no untreated observations have propensity scores within the specified caliper 
distance, the treated observation is left unmatched and is excluded from the matched sample. We 
were able to successfully match 1,005 liquid CDS observations to the control group, yielding 
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2,010 firm-year observations for our regression analysis. We also test the matched samples for 
covariate balancing. As evidenced from Panel B, the differences in variable means between the 
high CDS liquidity sample and the control sample are insignificant for all firm characteristics 
employed in the liquid CDS Probit model.  
We present the regression analysis for the matched samples in Panel C of Table 4. Despite 
a substantially smaller sample size relative to the one employed in our primary tests, we find a 
statistically significant effect of Liquid CDS on earnings forecasts disclosure. This result holds 
for both the likelihood of issuing a management forecast and the number of management 
forecasts. In untabulated robustness analyses, we employ coarser caliper distances that yield 
slightly unbalanced but larger samples; we find that our inferences are unchanged.  
In a further attempt to address endogeneity concerns, we employ an instrumental variables 
approach. Panel D of Table 4 presents the results of the second stage of the two-stage estimation, 
where the first stage is the liquid CDS Probit model presented in Panel A. The results are robust 
to this alternative econometric approach. We continue to find that managers of firms with highly 
liquid CDSs are more likely to voluntarily disclose earnings news via management forecasts and 
to disclose a higher number of these forecasts. In untabulated robustness tests, we find that the 
IV estimation is not sensitive to using the quintile and quartile rank measures of our instrumental 
variables (the same applies to the PSM approach).  
While the PSM- and IV-based analyses suggest that systematic difference between firms 
with liquid CDSs and other sample firms are unlikely to explain our main findings, we realize 
that it is always challenging to rule out endogeneity concerns. Hence, we supplement these tests 
with two additional sets of analyses that focus on the comparison of firms with low and high 
CDS trading liquidity.    
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4.3 Restricted sample analysis  
         4.3.1 Earnings forecast activity of liquid versus non-liquid CDS firms 
Potential endogeneity concerns associated with the differential characteristics of high CDS 
liquidity firms are likely to be the strongest when comparing these firms to those without any 
traded CDS contracts. Thus, we restrict the analysis to CDS firms (firm-year observations after 
the initiation of CDS trading) and directly compare firms with liquid CDS contracts to CDS 
firms with low liquidity (Saretto and Tookes, 2013, follow a similar approach).  
We re-estimate model 1 for the CDS firm sample and present this analysis in Panel A of 
Table 5. The coefficients on the Liquid CDS variable continue to be significant in both columns, 
with a slightly lower economic significance relative to the results presented in Table 3, Panel A, 
further mitigating endogeneity concerns. Relative to firms with low liquidity CDS contracts, 
having highly liquid contracts increases the likelihood of a management forecast by 10.0%. The 
incidence rate ratio for the management forecasts of firms with liquid CDS trading relative to 
that of firms with low CDS liquidity is 1.36.  
4.3.2 Liquidity change analysis 
An additional approach to address endogeneity concerns utilizing the sample of CDS firms 
is to examine voluntary disclosure around the change in CDS liquidity. More specifically, we 
isolate the event of a change in a firm’s CDS liquidity from low to high in a given year and 
perform a comparative analysis of managers’ voluntary disclosure in the pre-change and post-
change periods. We focus on the three year period starting the year of the CDS liquidity change 
(years t to t+2) versus the three year period prior to the change (years t-3 to t-1).18 We estimate 
the following model: 
                                                
18 We observe that the change to higher liquidity remains relatively stable. The vast majority of firms that 
experience a change from low to high liquidity CDS trading do not revert back to low liquidity in subsequent years.  
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ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ	ሺܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐݏሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܦܵ	ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ	ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁ ൅ ߚଶܨ݅ݎ݉	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ, ሺ3ሻ 
where Forecast and Number of Forecasts are defined as in previous analyses. Our main variable 
of interest, CDS Liquidity Change, takes the value of 1 in the post-change period and zero in the 
pre-change period. We include the same control variables as in our primary tests.  
As evidenced in Panel B of Table 5, the management forecast activity is significantly more 
intensive following the increase in CDS contract liquidity. Economically, the likelihood of a 
management forecast is higher by 5.3% following an increase in CDS liquidity. The incidence 
rate ratio for management forecasts following liquidity change relative to that of the previous 
period is 1.54. Hence, liquidity change tests further mitigate the concern that endogeneity drives 
our main results.   
4.4 High CDS liquidity and bad news management forecasts  
Having shown that liquid CDSs are associated with the manager’s decision to issue 
earnings forecasts, we next explore whether they particularly impact the voluntary disclosure of 
bad news. We expect the disciplining effect of liquid CDS trading to pressure managers to 
enhance the voluntary disclosure of bad news, despite managers’ career- and wealth-related 
incentives for delaying the revelation of adverse information. To examine our prediction, we 
limit our sample to forecasting firms (firm-year observations with at least one management 
forecast) and examine the frequency of bad news management forecasts. We estimate the 
following model: 
ܤܽ݀	ܰ݁ݓݏ	ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ	ܯ݁ܽݏݑݎ݁
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀	ܥܦܵ ൅ ߚଶܨ݅ݎ݉	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ, ሺ4ሻ 
 
where Bad News Forecast Frequency Measure is one of the following two variables: Bad News 
27 
 
Forecast Frequency and Relative Bad News Forecast Frequency, reflecting the number of bad 
news management forecasts within a given year and the proportion of bad news forecasts to the 
total number of forecasts within a given year, respectively. We identify bad news earnings 
forecasts by comparing the management forecast with the most recent consensus analyst forecast 
(e.g., Anilowski et al., 2007), after adjusting for bundled forecasts following the procedure in 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013). On average, the forecasting firms in our sample issue 1.77 bad 
news forecasts per year; the relative frequency of bad news forecasts to total forecasts is 37.3%. 
As in previous analyses, Liquid CDS reflects whether a firm has liquid CDS contracts. We 
include the same set of firm-level controls as in our other tests.  
We find strong support for our prediction with respect to the frequency of negative news 
forecasts (Table 6, Panel A). The coefficient on Liquid CDS is positive and significant when 
estimating both the absolute and relative frequency of bad news management forecasts in 
columns 1 and 2, respectively. Economically, the incidence rate ratio of bad news forecasts for 
firms with liquid CDSs relative to that of firms with thinly traded CDSs is 1.19. The proportion 
of bad news management forecasts is higher by 5.1% for high CDS liquidity firms, which 
represents 13.6% of the mean bad news relative frequency for the sample firms. These results are 
consistent with our prediction regarding the disciplining effect of liquid CDSs on managers’ 
voluntary disclosure of bad earnings news.  
We seek to provide further support for this inference by testing whether the effect of CDS 
liquidity on the frequency of bad news earnings forecasts strengthens with more negative credit 
news (Table 6, Panel B). If the threat of informed lenders trading on private information 
incentivizes managers to level the playing field between informed and uninformed investors, we 
expect this effect to be stronger when CDS spread changes are high, conveying the arrival of 
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negative credit news to investors. To conduct these tests, we employ our bad news forecast 
frequency model (model 4) and substitute Liquid CDS with two variables: Liquid CDS High 
Spread Change and Liquid CDS Low Spread Change. Liquid CDS High Spread Change Return 
(Liquid CDS Low Spread Change) is an indicator variable taking the value of one if a firm with 
liquid CDSs experiences an annual CDS spread change that falls in the top tercile (bottom two 
terciles) of CDS spread changes in a given forecast year, zero otherwise. To capture firm specific 
news, we base the CDS spread change measure on a firm’s abnormal CDS spread change relative 
to the average CDS spread change of all firms in the firm’s credit rating category (we use four 
common credit rating categories: AAA to AA-, A+ to BBB+, BBB to BB and BB- to D).19 
The results reveal that the effect of liquid CDSs on the frequency of bad news earnings 
forecasts is substantially stronger when firms experience high CDS spread changes in both the 
absolute and relative frequency of bad news earnings forecast estimations (the F-test indicates 
that the coefficients on Liquid CDS High Spread Change are significantly higher relative to those 
on Liquid CDS Low Spread Change). We view these CDS-spread-based results as providing 
further support for the disciplining role of the liquid CDS market.  
In the next set of analyses, we focus on the frequency of unbundled bad news earnings 
forecasts (forecasts that are not bundled with earnings announcements). Although issuing 
earnings forecasts in conjunction with earnings announcements has become a common practice 
in recent years (Anilowski et al., 2007, and Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009), unbundled forecasts 
are typically more salient and likely to provide more timely earnings expectation updates to 
investors (e.g., Atiase et al., 2005, and Baginski et al., 2012). Consequently, if active CDS 
trading pressures managers to promptly disclose adverse information, we predict that firms with 
                                                
19 In untabulated robustness tests, we base Liquid CDS High Spread Change (Liquid CDS Low Spread Change) on 
the median value of abnormal CDS return in a given year. We find that our results are very similar.  
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liquid CDSs have a higher frequency of unbundled bad news earnings forecasts.  
We employ model 4 above with the number of unbundled bad news management forecasts 
– Unbundled Bad News Forecast Frequency and Unbundled Relative Bad News Forecast 
Frequency – as the dependent variables. The results reported in Table 6, Panel C reveal a 
positive and significant relation between Liquid CDS and the frequency of unbundled bad news 
earnings forecasts. In terms of economic significance, the incidence rate ratio of unbundled bad 
news forecasts for firms with liquid CDSs relative to that of firms with non-liquid CDSs is 1.19 
and the proportion of unbundled bad news earnings forecasts is higher by 5.5% for high CDS 
liquidity firms. In Table 6, Panel D, we augment model 4 for unbundled forecasts with the Liquid 
CDS High Spread Change and Liquid CDS Low Spread Change variables. Consistent with 
expectations, the effect of CDS liquidity on both the absolute and relative frequency of 
unbundled bad news earnings forecasts is stronger when CDS returns are high, but these results 
are only marginally significant (the F-test indicates that the coefficients on Liquid CDS High 
Spread Change Return are significantly higher relative to the coefficients on Liquid CDS Low 
Spread Change at the 10% level, one-sided).  
In untabulated tests, we examine two additional aspects of managers’ earnings forecast 
choices, forecast precision and specificity. It is possible that due to CDS market pressure, 
managers are not only more likely to issue earnings forecasts, but also enhance the 
informativeness of earnings forecasts via improving forecast precision and specificity. However, 
we do not find a significant relation between these forecast characteristics and liquid CDSs.  
4.5. Liquid CDSs and firm-initiated press releases as an additional disclosure channel  
While earnings forecasts are a firm’s primary voluntary disclosure device (Beyer et al., 
2010), managers may also convey information to investors via other channels. To provide a more 
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complete picture of the effect of active CDS trading on voluntary disclosure, in this section, we 
examine the relation between a firm’s liquid CDSs and its disclosures via press releases. We 
acknowledge that quantifying voluntary disclosure via press release is challenging for two 
reasons. First, some press releases may accompany mandatory SEC filings, but, short of reading 
all the press releases issued by the sample firms, we cannot distinguish these press releases from 
the voluntary ones. Second, the estimation of the sign of the press release news is mainly 
qualitative and relies on linguistic analyses, resulting in a less precise news measure than 
earnings forecast news. We therefore view our press release tests as largely supplementary to our 
earnings forecast analyses.   
We obtain press release data from the RavenPack database. RavenPack reports press 
releases disseminated via Dow Jones Newswires and employs a variety of advanced textual 
analysis techniques to create news sentiment scores for each press release. To ensure that we are 
capturing firm-initiated press releases, we only include press releases with a relevance score of 
90 or greater. The relevance score is assigned by RavenPack to indicate how strongly the firm is 
related to the underlying news story; press releases with a relevance score below 90 often relate 
to cases where the firm is mentioned in press releases of other firms. To measure whether a press 
release conveys positive or negative news, we employ RavenPack’s Composite Sentiment Score 
(CSS), which reflects the strength of the news sentiment in a press release.20 CSS scores range 
                                                
20 CSS combines 5 sentiment scores (PEQ, BEE, BMQ, BCA and BAM), while ensuring that there is no sentiment 
disagreement amongst these scores. The PEQ score represents the news sentiment of a given news item according to 
the PEQ classifier, which specializes in identifying positive and negative words and phrases in articles about firms 
with publicly traded equity. The BEE score represents the news sentiment of a given story according to the BEE 
classifier, which specializes in news stories about earnings evaluations. The BMQ score represents the news 
sentiment of a given story according to the BMQ classifier, which specializes in short commentary and editorials on 
global equity markets. The BCA score represents the news sentiment of a given news story according to the BCA 
classifier, which specializes in reports on corporate action announcements. The BAM score represents the news 
sentiment of a given story according to the BAM classifier, which specializes in news stories about mergers, 
acquisitions and takeovers. The PEQ and BEE classifiers are dictionary-based measures, while the BMQ, BCA and 
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from 0 to 100, with 50 indicating the cutoff between positive and negative news. To create a 
sharper differentiation between negative and positive press releases, in untabulated robustness 
tests, we allow for a neutral news range. We define press releases with a score above 51 as 
indicating positive news, press releases with a score below 49 as indicating negative news and 
press releases with a score between 49 and 51 as indicating neutral news. Our findings and 
inferences are robust to alternative cutoffs for the neutral news range (untabulated).  
After matching our sample to RavenPack, we identify press release data for the vast 
majority of the sample firms (23,555 firm-year observations). Untabulated descriptive statistics 
suggest that the mean (median) value of the number of press releases issued by the sample firms 
during a given year is 43.5 (34). We start by investigating the effect of liquid CDSs on the 
number of press releases within a given year (because all firms in our sample have at least one 
press release per year, we do not estimate the likelihood of press releases). We estimate model 1 
above with the number of press releases – Number of Press Releases – as the dependent variable. 
We present the results of this estimation in Table 7, column 1. We find a positive and significant 
coefficient on Liquid CDS, suggesting that firms with actively traded CDS contracts issue a 
higher number of press releases. This effect is also economically significant: the incidence rate 
ratio for press releases issued by firms with liquid CDSs relative to that of firms with low 
liquidity CDSs is 1.30.  
We next examine whether active CDS trading disciplines managers to voluntary disclose 
negative press releases (columns 2 and 3). Untabulated descriptive statistics reveal that managers 
tend to communicate primarily positive and neutral news via press releases. Sample firms issue, 
on average, 20.36 and 19.88 positive and neutral press releases per year, respectively, while 
                                                                                                                                                          
BAM classifiers are based on the Bayesian learning approach. All five of the sentiment scores are applied to the 
news item when evaluating its CSS score.  
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having only 2.95 negative press releases per year. We employ model 4 above to estimate the 
frequency of negative press releases. We employ two frequency measures: Bad News Press 
Release Frequency and Relative Bad News Press Release Frequency, reflecting the number of 
bad news press releases within a given year and the proportion of bad news press releases to the 
total number of press releases within a given year, respectively. We present the results in 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 7. The coefficient on Liquid CDS is positive and significant. The 
incidence rate ratio of bad news press releases issued by firms with liquid CDSs relative to that 
of other sample firms is 1.36. In terms of relative frequency, the proportion of bad news press 
releases is higher by 1.0% for high CDS liquidity firms. While this effect may seem to be 
modest, given the extremely low frequency of bad news press releases, it represents 15.8% of the 
average annual bad news press release frequency for the sample firms.  
Finally, in Panel B of Table 7, we explore whether active CDS trading increases press 
release disclosure to a larger extent when high CDS spread changes convey to investors the 
arrival of bad news. We augment bad news press release frequency model with the Liquid CDS 
High Spread Change and Liquid CDS Low Spread Change variables, as defined previously. 
Consistent with our expectation, we find that the effect of liquid CDSs on the frequency of 
negative press releases is significantly higher when CDS spread changes are high; this effect 
holds for both the absolute and relative frequency of negative press releases (the F-test indicates 
that the coefficients on Liquid CDS High Spread Change are significantly higher relative to those 
on Liquid CDS Low Spread Change in columns 1 and 2).    
Overall, our tests of firm-initiated press releases supplement our management forecast 
analyses and provide further support for the role of liquid CDSs in determining voluntary 
disclosure choices. These tests also suggest that the pressure exerted by a liquid CDS market to 
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level the playing field between informed and uninformed investors may enhance voluntary 
disclosures through multiple channels. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The development of the CDS market is perhaps one of the most significant innovations in 
the financial institutional environment. The CDS market has grown rapidly in the last two 
decades, transacting trillions of dollars in notional amounts. However, a frequently expressed 
concern is the market’s susceptibility to insider trading, given that financial institutions, the 
largest participant group in the market, often have access to privileged information about the 
CDS reference entities with whom they have lending relationships. CDS spreads reflect a 
substantial amount of private information transmitted via lenders’ informed trading, with 
changes in CDS pricing providing more timely feedback on a firm’s performance than its bond 
or equity pricing (e.g., Acharya and Johnson, 2007, and Whitehead, 2012). We argue that the 
threat of private information revelation in CDS spreads will increase managers’ exposure to the 
litigation and reputation risks associated with the non-disclosure of material price-sensitive 
information. In response to this heightened risk exposure, we predict that managers will enhance 
their voluntary disclosures to level the playing field between informed and uninformed investors. 
We expect this effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure to be evident mostly for firms with 
liquid CDSs, given that prices are likely to be more informative when securities are actively 
traded. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that firms with actively traded CDS contracts are 
more likely to inform investors via earnings forecasts. We further find that these firms exhibit a 
higher frequency of bad news management forecasts and of unbundled bad news management 
forecasts, in particular. In addition to eliciting management forecasts, we also find that liquid 
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CDSs prompt enhanced disclosures via managerial press releases. Overall, our evidence suggests 
that active CDS trading plays a disciplining role by pressuring managers into promptly revealing 
their private information, thus enriching the information environment in capital markets. 
Our paper sheds light on how changes in the institutional environment affect changes in 
managerial disclosure behavior. Prior empirical evidence shows that a significant majority of 
Compustat/CRSP firms do not issue even a single management earnings forecast in a year (Beyer 
et al., 2010). Moreover, prior empirical and survey research finds that managers prolong the 
release of bad news to investors due to career- and wealth-related concerns. The advent of CDSs 
on the financial landscape has introduced an alternate information source that reveals private 
information before it is impounded in equity prices. Our findings show that this alternate 
information source (i.e., insider trading in the CDS market), although itself a cause for concern, 
results in a positive externality for the capital markets. It helps to alleviate managers’ reluctance 
to issue management forecasts, in particular bad news forecasts, and encourages prompt 
disclosure of material price-sensitive information to market participants. 
Acharya and Johnson (2007) question whether there is a case for the current regulatory 
response to curb insider trading in the CDS market, in view of the lack of evidence of any 
adverse effects on prices or liquidity in either the equity or credit markets. Our evidence suggests 
another potential unintended consequence of such regulatory action. Restricting insider trading in 
the CDS market may adversely impact the information environment in the capital markets by 
displacing an effective incentive for managers’ voluntary disclosures.                     
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions  
Variable   Definition 
Analyst Following = Analyst coverage at the end of the fiscal year, calculated as 
the log (1+ the number of I/B/E/S analysts who issue annual 
earnings forecasts for the firm).  
Asset Maturity = Weighted maturity of the firm’s assets, defined as (gross PPE 
divided by depreciation expense × gross PPE divided by total 
assets) + (current assets divided by cost of goods sold × 
current assets divided by total assets). 
Bad News Forecast Frequency = Number of bad news management earnings forecasts issued 
during the year.  
Bad News Press Release Frequency = Number of bad news press releases issued during the year, 
estimated by the press releases covered by the RavenPack 
database, with a relevance score of 90 or greater. Bad news 
press releases are defined as those with a RavenPack’s 
Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) of below 49. 
Bond Investors’ Hedging and Trading Demand = The decile rank measure of the average annual bond trading 
volume for a firm’s two-digit SIC industry peers.  
Equity Issuance  = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm issued equity 
during the forecast year, zero otherwise.  
Forecast = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues at least 
one earnings forecast during the year, and zero otherwise.   
High Litigation Industry = An indicator variable equal to one for high litigation 
industries, zero otherwise. The following SIC codes are 
considered high litigation: 2844-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 
3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 8731-8734. 
Institutional Ownership = Institutional ownership (%) at the end of a given fiscal year, 
measured as the fraction of total shares outstanding held by 
institutional investors. 
Leverage = Total debt plus debt in current liabilities  divided by total 
assets. 
Liquid CDS = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s annual Depth 
measure in a given year is above the sample median depth in 
that year, zero otherwise. Depth is the number of distinct 
dealers providing CDS spread quotes for the firm on a given 
day, averaged over the year. For the analyses in Table 3, Panel 
B, this indicator variable is equal to one if the firm’s annual 
Term Count measure in a given year is above the sample 
median term count in that year, zero otherwise. Term Count is 
the count of a firm’s CDS contracts with distinct maturities 
(terms) traded on a given day, averaged over the year. 
Liquid CDS Change = An indicator variable that takes the value of one in the post- 
CDS liquidity change period (the year of a firm’s CDS 
liquidity changed and the following two years) and zero in the 
pre-change period (three years prior to the year of a firm’s 
CDS liquidity change).  
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Variable   Definition 
Liquid CDS High Spread Change 
(Liquid CDS Low Spread Change) 
= An indicator variable equal to one if a firm with liquid 
CDSs experiences an annual CDS spread change that falls 
in the top tercile (bottom two terciles) of CDS spread 
changes in a given forecast year, zero otherwise. To 
capture firm specific news, the CDS spread change 
measure is based on a firm’s abnormal CDS spread 
change relative to the average CDS spread change of all 
firms in the firm’s credit rating category (we use four 
common credit rating categories: AAA to AA-, A+ to 
BBB+, BBB to BB, and BB- to D). 
Log (Total Assets) = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year. 
Market to Book = Ratio of market value to book value of equity at the end of 
fiscal year. 
Number of Forecasts = Number of management earnings forecasts issued during 
the year.  
Number of Lenders = The decile rank measure of the number of unique lenders 
involved in a firm’s outstanding syndicated loans. 
Number of Press Releases = The number of press releases issued by a firm during a 
given year, estimated by the press releases covered by the 
RavenPack database, with a relevance score of 90 or 
greater. 
Relative Bad News Forecast Frequency = The relative frequency of bad news management earnings 
forecasts issued during the year, defined as the number of 
bad news forecasts divided by the total number of 
forecasts. 
Relative Bad News Press Release Frequency = The relative frequency of bad news press releases issued 
during the year, defined as the number of bad news press 
releases divided by the total number of press releases.  
Return Volatility = Standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns 
measured over the forecast year (multiplied by 100 for 
scaling purposes). 
ROA = Return on assets, calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
Tangibility  = Net PPE divided by total assets  
Unbundled Bad News Forecast Frequency = Number of unbundled bad news management forecasts 
issued during the year. Unbundled forecasts are defined as 
those management forecasts that are not bundled with 
earnings announcements (i.e., forecasts issued outside of 
the two days window around an earnings announcement). 
Unbundled Relative Bad News Forecast Frequency = The relative number of unbundled bad news management 
earnings forecasts issued during the year, defined as the 
number of unbundled bad news forecasts divided by the 
total number of forecasts. 
Volatility of Earnings = Standard deviation of annual changes in earnings divided 
by total assets over the previous 5 year period.  
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TABLE 1  
Sample Selection and Composition 
This table presents the sample selection process.  
# of firms  # of firm-years 
(1)     Observations with First Call coverage from 2002 to 2010 8,702 57,396 
(2)     Sample after eliminating observations with missing data 5,117 25,130 
(3)     Sample observations with traded CDS contracts 775 4,517 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics (see Table 1 for the sample selection procedure). Variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Depth 4,517 6.045 4.405 2.644 4.568 8.596 
Liquid CDS 25,130 0.090 0.286 0 0 0 
Forecast 25,130 0.425 0.494 0 0 1 
Number of Forecasts 25,130 2.050 3.009 0 0 4 
Log (Total Assets) 25,130 7.091 1.888 5.703 6.957 8.275 
Market to Book 25,130 3.063 3.092 1.411 2.135 3.470 
ROA 25,130 -0.003 0.172 0.000 0.031 0.073 
Return Volatility 25,130 3.039 1.651 1.865 2.605 3.754 
Institutional Ownership (%) 25,130 51.313 34.246 19.934 56.679 81.016 
Analyst Following 25,130 1.956 0.621 1.386 1.946 2.398 
Equity Issuance  25,130 0.092 0.288 0 0 0 
High Litigation Industry 25,130 0.327 0.469 0 0 1 
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TABLE 3 
 The Relation between Active CDS Trading and Management Forecasts 
 
This table presents the analyses of the association between liquid CDS trading and management forecasting 
behavior. The analyses in Panel A utilize our primary CDS liquidity measure based on the Depth of a firm’s traded 
CDS contracts. The analyses in Panel B utilize an alternative CDS liquidity measure based on the Term Count of a 
firm’s traded CDS contracts. In both panels, specification 1 presents a Probit regression of the likelihood of a firm 
issuing at least one earnings forecast during the year, while specification 2 presents a Poisson regression of the count 
of the number of management forecasts within the year. Robust z-stats are in brackets and are clustered by firm. 
Panel A: Liquid CDSs and the Likelihood and Number of Management Forecasts 
1 2 
Dep Var = Forecast Number of Forecasts 
       
Liquid CDS 0.359*** 0.395*** 
[5.39] [6.80] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.132*** -0.092*** 
[-11.71] [-7.14] 
Market to Book -0.018*** -0.009* 
[-3.77] [-1.73] 
ROA 1.093*** 1.771*** 
[12.11] [13.94] 
Institutional Ownership 0.006*** 0.008*** 
[13.33] [13.11] 
Analyst Following 0.524*** 0.506*** 
[16.79] [15.65] 
Return Volatility -0.090*** -0.113*** 
[-11.87] [-12.28] 
Equity Issuance  -0.204*** -0.191*** 
[-5.61] [-4.23] 
High Litigation Industry 0.201*** 0.219*** 
[5.09] [5.48] 
N 25,130 25,130 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.138 
 (continued) 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
The Relation between Active CDS Trading and Management Forecasts 
 
Panel B: Alternative Measure of CDS Liquidity 
1 2 
Dep Var = Forecast Number of Forecasts 
       
Liquid CDS 0.353*** 0.387*** 
[5.48] [6.90] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.132*** -0.090*** 
[-11.76] [-7.01] 
Market to Book -0.018*** -0.008 
[-3.72] [-1.62] 
ROA 1.097*** 1.783*** 
[12.13] [13.99] 
Institutional Ownership 0.006*** 0.008*** 
[13.31] [13.13] 
Analyst Following 0.527*** 0.510*** 
[16.90] [15.81] 
Return Volatility -0.091*** -0.114*** 
[-11.97] [-12.37] 
Equity Issuance  -0.206*** -0.195*** 
[-5.68] [-4.31] 
High Litigation Industry 0.201*** 0.220*** 
[5.10] [5.50] 
N 25,130 25,130 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.138 
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TABLE 4 
Propensity Score Matching and Instrumental Variable Analyses 
 
This table presents the propensity score matching (PSM) and instrumental variable (IV) analyses. Panel A presents 
the first stage Probit model of liquid CDS trading, with Liquid CDS as the dependent variable. Panel B reports 
differences for explanatory variables between the liquid CDS sample and matched-firm sample to provide evidence 
of covariate balancing in PSM estimation. Panel C presents PSM model estimation, while Panel D presents the 
second-stage results using the IV technique. In both the Panels C and D, specification 1 presents a Probit regression 
of the likelihood of a firm issuing at least one earnings forecast during the year, while specification 2 presents a 
Poisson regression of the count of the number of management forecasts within the year. Robust z-stats are in 
brackets and are clustered by firm. 
Panel A: CDS Liquidity Probit Model   
Dep Var =  Liquid CDS 
Asset Maturity 0.010* 
[1.74] 
Leverage 0.329 
[1.44] 
MTB 0.026*** 
[2.81] 
ROA 0.033 
[0.09] 
Tangibility -0.409 
[-1.55] 
Log Total Assets 0.643*** 
[21.14] 
Volatility of Earnings -0.740 
[-1.54] 
Bond Investors’ Hedging and Speculative Demand -0.042*** 
[-3.47] 
Number of Lenders 0.180*** 
[9.67] 
Wald Chi2 test 103.94 
(p-value) [0.00] 
N                19,340 
Pseudo R2                 0.467 
                              (continued) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Propensity Score Matching and Instrumental Variable Analyses 
 
Panel B: Covariate Balancing       
  Means Difference in  means 
Liquid CDS =1 Liquid CDS =0 [t-stats] 
        
Asset Maturity 11.58 12.19 -0.61 
[1.32] 
Leverage 0.28 0.28 -0.01 
[0.98] 
MTB 3.17 3.18 -0.01 
[0.05] 
ROA 0.05 0.05 0.00 
[0.11] 
Tangibility 0.35 0.36 -0.02 
[1.57] 
Log Total Assets 9.06 9.10 -0.04 
[0.79] 
Volatility of Earnings 0.04 0.04 0.00 
[0.72] 
Bond Investors’ Hedging and Trading Demand 6.19 6.20 0.00 
[0.01] 
Number of Lenders 8.36 8.23 0.14 
[-1.42] 
N 1,005 1,005 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Propensity Score Matching and Instrumental Variable Analyses 
 
Panel C: Propensity Score Matching  
1 2 
Dep Var = Forecast Number of Forecasts 
       
Liquid CDS 0.326*** 0.304*** 
[3.28] [3.77] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.199*** -0.110*** 
[-4.24] [-2.84] 
Market to Book -0.010 0.008 
[-0.67] [0.67] 
ROA -0.731 0.048 
[-1.40] [0.12] 
Institutional Ownership 0.008*** 0.007*** 
[5.11] [4.41] 
Analyst Following 0.410*** 0.390*** 
[4.86] [5.59] 
Return Volatility -0.190*** -0.183*** 
[-6.73] [-7.18] 
Equity Issuance  -0.148 -0.197 
[-1.03] [-1.47] 
High Litigation Industry 0.105 0.066 
[0.96] [0.78] 
N 2,010 2,010 
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.122 
 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Propensity Score Matching and Instrumental Variable Analyses 
 
Panel D: Instrumental Variable Approach 
1 2 
Dep Var = Forecast Number of Forecasts 
       
Liquid CDS 2.303*** 2.614*** 
[6.52] [5.12] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.227*** -0.239*** 
[-8.50] [-5.61] 
Market to Book -0.030*** -0.030*** 
[-8.27] [-4.40] 
ROA 1.149*** 1.759*** 
[14.37] [11.48] 
Institutional Ownership 0.006*** 0.007*** 
[14.95] [11.36] 
Analyst Following 0.289*** 0.463*** 
[11.36] [9.47] 
Return Volatility -0.097*** -0.112*** 
[-11.47] [-8.06] 
Equity Issuance  -0.150*** -0.111* 
[-4.16] [-1.91] 
High Litigation Industry 0.153*** 0.153*** 
[8.50] [3.10] 
N 19,340 19,340 
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TABLE 5 
Restricted Sample and Liquidity Change Analyses 
 
This table presents two sets of analyses based on the sample that excludes non-CDS firms (firm-year observations 
without traded CDS contracts). In Panel A, the sample is restricted to firm-year observations with traded CDS 
contracts. Thus, these tests compare firms with liquid CDSs to firms with thinly traded CDSs. Panel B presents the 
analysis of the change in CDS liquidity from low to high (the Liquid CDS Change variable). The sample period in 
Panel B is restricted to the three-year period prior to the year of the liquidity change and the three year period 
starting with the year of the liquidity change. In both panels, specification 1 presents a Probit regression of the 
likelihood of a firm issuing at least one earnings forecast during the year, while specification 2 presents a Poisson 
regression of the count of the number of management forecasts within the year. Robust z-stats are in brackets and 
are clustered by firm. 
Panel A: The Restricted Sample Analyses  
1 2 
Dep Var = Forecast Number of Forecasts 
       
Liquid CDS 0.254*** 0.312*** 
[3.35] [4.84] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.115*** -0.095*** 
[-3.03] [-2.87] 
Market to Book -0.000 0.003 
[-0.04] [0.29] 
ROA 0.662* 1.634*** 
[1.69] [3.97] 
Institutional Ownership 0.002* 0.002 
[1.71] [1.50] 
Analyst Following 0.233*** 0.220*** 
[3.07] [3.70] 
Return Volatility -0.150*** -0.137*** 
[-8.15] [-7.25] 
Equity Issuance  -0.395*** -0.471*** 
[-4.55] [-4.49] 
High Litigation Industry 0.137 0.141* 
[1.30] [1.79] 
N 4,517 4,517 
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.070 
(continued) 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Restricted Sample and Liquidity Change Analyses 
 
Panel B: Liquidity Change Analyses 
1 2 
Dep Var = Forecast Number of Forecasts 
        
Liquid CDS Change 0.140** 0.433*** 
[2.42] [8.15] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.077* -0.055 
[-1.69] [-1.39] 
Market to Book 0.046*** 0.034*** 
[2.94] [4.23] 
ROA -0.523 0.522 
[-0.87] [1.13] 
Institutional Ownership 0.004** 0.002 
[2.32] [1.50] 
Analyst Following 0.216** 0.105 
[1.97] [1.26] 
Return Volatility -0.022 -0.074** 
[-0.63] [-2.37] 
Equity Issuance  -0.292** -0.198* 
[-2.52] [-1.68] 
High Litigation Industry 0.147 0.222** 
[1.15] [2.43] 
N 2,292 2,292 
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.054 
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TABLE 6 
 Active CDS Trading and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts  
 
This table presents the analyses of the relation between liquid CDS trading and the frequency of bad news earnings 
forecasts. The analyses in this table are restricted to forecasting firms (firm-year observations with at least one 
management forecast). Panel A presents the analyses of the frequency of bad news earnings forecasts, while Panel B 
presents the analyses of the frequency of bad news earnings forecasts, conditional on the credit news (measured by 
the magnitude of abnormal annual CDS spread changes). Panels C and D present similar analyses for the frequency 
of unbundled bad news earnings forecasts (forecast that are not issued in conjunction with earnings announcements). 
In all panels, specification 1 presents Poisson regressions of the frequency of bad news management forecasts, while 
specification 2 presents a Tobit regression of relative frequency of bad news earnings forecasts (the ratio of bad 
news to the total number of management forecasts).  Robust z-stats are in brackets and are clustered by firm. 
Panel A: Liquid CDSs and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts 
1 2 
Dep Var = Bad News Forecast Frequency Relative Bad News Forecast Frequency 
       
Liquid CDS 0.177*** 0.051** 
[3.31] [2.35] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.017 -0.029*** 
[-1.32] [-4.93] 
Market to Book -0.010** -0.009*** 
[-2.16] [-4.37] 
ROA 0.151 -0.343*** 
[1.42] [-5.78] 
Institutional Ownership 0.004*** 0.001*** 
[7.69] [4.84] 
Analyst Following 0.024 -0.044*** 
[0.78] [-3.14] 
Return Volatility -0.006 0.004 
[-0.58] [0.69] 
Equity Issuance  0.005 0.030 
[0.13] [1.39] 
High Litigation Industry -0.017 -0.060*** 
[-0.47] [-4.12] 
N 10,692 10,692 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.018 
(continued) 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Active CDS Trading and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts 
 
Panel B: The Impact of Liquid CDSs, Conditional on Credit News 
1 2 
Dep Var = Bad News Forecast Frequency Relative Bad News Forecast Frequency 
       
 Liquid CDS Low Spread Change 0.119** 0.032 
[1.97] [1.37] 
Liquid CDS High Spread Change 0.276*** 0.084*** 
[4.67] [3.28] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.016 -0.029*** 
[-1.29] [-4.92] 
Market to Book -0.010** -0.009*** 
[-2.14] [-4.36] 
ROA 0.154 -0.342*** 
[1.45] [-5.78] 
Institutional Ownership 0.004*** 0.001*** 
[7.71] [4.84] 
Analyst Following 0.024 -0.044*** 
[0.79] [-3.14] 
Return Volatility -0.006 0.003 
[-0.63] [0.66] 
Equity Issuance  0.004 0.030 
[0.11] [1.38] 
High Litigation Industry -0.016 -0.060*** 
[-0.46] [-4.12] 
 
F-test: Liquid CDS High Spread Change vs. 0.157 0.051 
Liquid CDS Low Spread Change [p-value] [0.006] [0.034] 
N 10,692 10,692 
Pseudo R2  0.009 0.018 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Active CDS Trading and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts 
 
Panel C: Unbundled Forecasts: Liquid CDSs and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts 
1 2 
Dep Var = Unbundled Bad News                 Forecast Frequency  
Unbundled Relative Bad News                  
Forecast Frequency 
       
Liquid CDS 0.177*** 0.055** 
[2.74] [2.36] 
Log (Total Assets) 0.032** -0.005 
[2.12] [-0.77] 
Market to Book 0.007 -0.000 
[1.22] [-0.01] 
ROA 0.401** -0.135** 
[2.46] [-2.14] 
Institutional Ownership 0.003*** 0.000** 
[4.43] [2.01] 
Analyst Following -0.043 -0.058*** 
[-1.08] [-3.91] 
Return Volatility -0.039*** -0.010* 
[-2.80] [-1.89] 
Equity Issuance  -0.210*** -0.063** 
[-3.43] [-2.57] 
High Litigation Industry 0.034 -0.012 
[0.77] [-0.79] 
N 10,692 10,692 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.004 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Active CDS Trading and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts  
 
Panel D: Unbundled Forecasts: The Impact of Liquid CDSs, Conditional on Credit News 
1 2 
Dep Var = Unbundled Bad News Forecast Frequency 
Unbundled Relative Bad News             
Forecast Frequency 
      
Liquid CDS Low Spread Change 0.135* 0.042 
[1.86] [1.64] 
Liquid CDS High Spread Change 0.251*** 0.079*** 
[3.38] [2.79] 
Log (Total Assets) 0.033** -0.004 
[2.14] [-0.75] 
Market to Book 0.007 0.000 
[1.24] [0.00] 
ROA 0.404** -0.135** 
[2.47] [-2.14] 
Institutional Ownership 0.003*** 0.000** 
[4.43] [2.02] 
Analyst Following -0.043 -0.058*** 
[-1.07] [-3.90] 
Return Volatility -0.039*** -0.010* 
[-2.84] [-1.91] 
Equity Issuance  -0.210*** -0.063** 
[-3.44] [-2.58] 
High Litigation Industry 0.034 -0.012 
[0.78] [-0.78] 
 
F-test: Liquid CDS High Spread Change vs. 0.116 0.038 
Liquid CDS Low Spread Change [p-value] [0.109] [0.164] 
N 10,692 10,692 
Pseudo R2  0.010 0.004 
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TABLE 7 
 Active CDS Trading and Voluntary Disclosure via Press Releases 
 
This table presents the analyses of the association between liquid CDS trading and voluntary disclosure via press 
releases. Panel A presents the analyses of the number of press releases and the frequency of negative press releases. 
Panel B presents the analyses of the frequency of negative press releases, conditional on credit news. In Panel A, 
specification 1 presents Poisson regression of the total number of press releases, specification 2 presents Poisson 
regressions of the frequency of negative press releases and specification 3 presents a Tobit regression of the relative 
frequency of negative press releases (the ratio of negative press releases to the total number of press releases). Panel 
B presents the analysis for the frequency and relative frequency of bad news press releases, conditional on the credit 
news (measured by the magnitude of abnormal annual CDS spread changes). In this panel, specification 1 presents 
Poisson regressions of the frequency of negative press releases and specification 2 presents a Tobit regression of the 
relative frequency of negative press releases (the ratio of negative press releases to the total number of press 
releases). Robust z-stats are in brackets and are clustered by firm. 
Panel A: Liquid CDSs and the Frequency of Press Releases 
1 2 3 
Dep Var = Number of             Press Releases 
Bad News                
Press Release Frequency 
Relative Bad News           
Press Release Frequency 
        
Liquid CDS 0.264*** 0.307*** 0.010*** 
[7.79] [6.86] [2.62] 
Log (Total Assets) 0.179*** 0.296*** 0.018*** 
[22.11] [28.93] [20.05] 
Market to Book 0.019*** 0.007 -0.001 
[6.22] [1.34] [-1.60] 
ROA -0.282*** -0.509*** -0.045*** 
[-7.42] [-6.48] [-7.05] 
Institutional Ownership 0.001* 0.001** 0 
[1.89] [2.36] [0.81] 
Analyst Following 0.205*** 0.102*** -0.007*** 
[10.93] [3.33] [-2.70] 
Return Volatility 0.015*** 0.090*** 0.009*** 
[4.35] [14.60] [12.81] 
Equity Issuance  0.098*** 0.144*** 0.006* 
[5.82] [4.50] [1.91] 
High Litigation Industry 0.247*** 0.203*** 0.006** 
[10.41] [5.05] [2.07] 
 
N 23,555 23,555 23,555 
Pseudo R2 0.344 0.182 0.178 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
Active CDS Trading and Voluntary Disclosure via Press Releases 
 
Panel B: The Impact of Liquid CDSs on the Frequency of Negative Press Releases, Conditional on Credit News  
1 2 
Dep Var = Bad News Press               Release Frequency 
Relative Bad News              
Press Release Frequency 
       
Liquid CDS Low Spread Change 0.257*** 0.005 
[5.39] [1.30] 
Liquid CDS High Spread Change 0.397*** 0.021*** 
[8.13] [3.98] 
Log (Total Assets) 0.296*** 0.018*** 
[28.95] [20.07] 
Market to Book 0.007 -0.001 
[1.36] [-1.60] 
ROA -0.510*** -0.045*** 
[-6.50] [-7.05] 
Institutional Ownership 0.001** 0.000 
[2.37] [0.81] 
Analyst Following 0.102*** -0.007*** 
[3.35] [-2.70] 
Return Volatility 0.088*** 0.009*** 
[14.44] [12.77] 
Equity Issuance  0.145*** 0.006* 
[4.51] [1.91] 
High Ligitation Industry 0.204*** 0.006** 
[5.06] [2.08] 
F-test: Liquid CDS High Spread Change vs. 0.139 0.016 
Liquid CDS Low Spread Change [p-value] [0.000] [0.000] 
N 23,555 23,555 
Pseudo R2  0.183 0.179 
 
 
